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Waiting For Homeland Security Theory
Christopher Bellavita
Nothing is harder, yet nothing is more necessary, than to speak of certain things whose existence is 
neither demonstrable nor probable. The very fact that serious and conscientious men treat them as 
existing things brings them a step closer to existence and to the possibility of being born.
–  Herman Hesse, attributed to "Albertus Secundus"1
ACT 1
A country road.  
A wooden table.  
A small whiteboard.
Gloaming.
SCENE 1 - THERE IS NOTHING TO BE DONE
The initial stage, the act of conceiving or inventing a theory, seems to me neither to call for logical 
analysis nor to be susceptible of it.
— Karl Popper 
CHARLES: Everyone should be their own homeland security theorist.2 
GAILE: Why in heaven's name would you wish that?  
BARCLAY: It would be pure chaos.
JACQUES: We already  have chaos.  At  least  intellectual chaos. Homeland security  has no 
theoretical center of gravity, no overall strategy for developing its theoretical foundations.
GAILE: (agreeing) It's a mishmash of loosely connected ideas, missions, and activities.
JACQUES: Observing  intellectual activity  in  homeland security  is like watching young  children 
playing soccer, running in packs to follow the ball. We can do better.
BARCLAY: (abstractly) I recall  reading something that  called homeland security  an anemic 
policy  enterprise.3 So many  people try  to do so many  things under  the same umbrella.  There is 
no central purpose to homeland security. One person called it an inconsistent hash. 4
CHARLES: (reflectively) Why  do we even  care whether  this activity  we credulously  call 
homeland security  has its own theoretical framework? What  would theory  do for  us as 
academics or for our students or practitioners?
JACQUES: (earnestly)  I've been  in this field since 9/11, and I believe we've just  begun to build a 
discipline.  I don't  want to have wasted the past decade on  something  that  just dissolves. And it 
will,  if we don't  bring  conceptual precision  to our  work. If homeland security  is ever  to be 
academically  respectable,  it  has to offer  more than  rhetoric and anecdotes.  As thinkers who care 
about  this field and who are  invested in  it, we have a  responsibility  to provide rigorous 
conceptual foundations for what we teach.
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BARCLAY: (approvingly) Yes.  Before we can develop a  homeland security  research  agenda, we 
need to ground the knowledge we create.  Theory  – whether derived deductively  or  inductively  – 
can help us do that.
CHARLES: I do not disagree with what you are saying.
GAILE: (annoyed)  Does that  mean  you  agree  with  us? Because if you  do,  the idea  of encouraging 
everyone to be their own theorist is silly. It's like letting anyone be a dentist.
CHARLES: (sharply) Allow  me some credit,  please. I've thought  at length  about this; my  thesis 
is not meant  merely  to be provocative.  And your  dentist  analogy  is fallacious.  Homeland security 
is many things, but nothing having to do with teeth.
GAILE: (gruffly) You know what I mean. What you propose....
CHARLES: (insistently)  No.  I do not know  what  you  mean, and that's a  central part  of the 
difficulty  trying to develop homeland security  theory.  I did not come to my  position  casually. A 
few  years ago I started thinking  about  this, wondering how  to bring  conceptual  order  to the 
homeland security  mess.  And I'm  not  talking  about what  practitioners do day  to day, although 
that  may  also be messy.  I'm  talking about  what  we do – in  the classrooms and in  our  research  – 
when  we talk  and write about homeland security.  I thought  we needed to start  with  theory,  and I 
worked to create one.
BARCLAY: (crisply) One? One theory of homeland security?
CHARLES: Yes, I thought  I'd  start with  grand theory. 5 I wanted something that  organized all 
homeland security  ideas.  I wanted an overarching perspective I could use to structure the way  I 
teach homeland security.
BARCLAY: How did that go?
CHARLES: (flatly) Not very well.
GAILE: I'm  not a  fan of grand theories. I question  a  need for  unique homeland security  theories, 
whether they  are grand theories,  mid range or  micro theories.6  We can  bring order  to our 
inquiry  of homeland security  problems, 7 by  using the theoretical frameworks provided by  the 
professions that make up homeland security  – law  enforcement, emergency  management,  the 
military, public health, and so on.8
BARCLAY: (musingly)  I'm  not convinced we can  do without unique homeland security  theories. 
However,  I prefer  mid-range theories myself.  I believe those could be created around the 
constituent elements of homeland security  – like  border  security, transportation,  intelligence, 
preparedness, or  critical infrastructure.  I believe if we understand the major pieces of homeland 
security  correctly, the entire theory-building  endeavor  will  take care of itself. The whole  will 
become apparent by aggregating the parts.
CHARLES: I have to disagree. I think you are confusing....
GAILE: (interrupting) I will  side with  at  least the spirit  of Professor  Barclay’s remarks here. 
Homeland security  is much  too big  an  activity  to presume any  of us know  enough  to create a 
universal  theory. We might  end up with  unique mid-range theories or  we may  use existing 
theoretical  perspectives, but we bring  rigor  to our  scholarship by  focusing on the conceptual 
building blocks of the discipline. 
JACQUES: (slowly)  I'm  not suggesting  any  of us are  smart enough  to theorize about  all of 
homeland security, but  I think we should try.  Or  at least  that's what  I've  been  doing.  We can 
always fall  back  on  mid-range theories if our  grand design  project does not  work out. But  we 
should at least try.
CHARLES: I disagree with  the three of you. My  experience and thinking  lead me to conclude we 
cannot have a  grand theory  of homeland security  or,  for  that  matter, mid-range theories that  will 
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do anyone much  good.  Perhaps there will be a  publication or  two from  the effort, but  I don't 
think it's going to make much difference to the field.
BARCLAY: But you said you started out wanting a grand theory.
CHARLES: (quietly) An unexpected event happened on my way there.
BARCLAY: What?
CHARLES: I got lost in semantics.
[Charles brushes dust from the table.]
SCENE 2 – SHREDS AND PATCHES
Here is the world, sound as a nut, perfect, not the smallest piece of chaos left, never a stitch nor an 
end, not a mark of haste, or botching, or second thought; but the theory of the world is a thing of shreds 
and patches. 
– Ralph Waldo Emerson
CHARLES: The more I researched, the more I realized I did not  understand very  well what 
theory  means. It  means lots of things. So if I wanted a  grand theory  of homeland security,  what 
exactly would that look like?
GAILE: (dismissively) I'm not an advocate of semantic inquiry. 
CHARLES: You’re saying you don’t care what words mean?
GAILE: I’m  saying if we went  around trying  to define everything precisely, we'd never get 
anything done.
JACQUES: (helpfully) That’s why  people in our  world value quantification.  There is not a  lot of 
discussion about the meaning of a number.
CHARLES: (acerbically) Right.  Like statistics?  Let’s talk  a  few  moments about 
heteroscedasticity or Markov's inequality. 
BARCLAY: We’re wandering  from  the point here.  Professor  Gaile is correct. Part of our 
obligation  as scholars is to decide to use a  word – like theory  – in  a  particular  way. As long as we 
specify  our  assumptions and identify  the decisions we made to operationalize the language we 
use, we’re okay. It is what scientists do.
CHARLES: (intransigently)  If you apply  that  logic  to the meaning  of theory,  you can  find 
authors agreeing  to use the word to signify  almost  anything  – from  individual hunch  to a  system 
of ideas that  purport to explain  or predict some phenomenon. 9 I don't  find such  a  broad range of 
meaning helpful.
GAILE: (harshly)  I don't  mean to belittle your  cognitive angst, but the meaning of theory  is very 
clear  to me.  I acknowledge there are many  ways to interpret  what  the word could mean, but  for 
most people a  theory  is a  collection  of ideas that  are integrated in  a  cohesive way.  Some theories 
describe  a  phenomenon, like homeland security. Some theories seek to explain something. 
There are, of course, predictive theories – one might call that the gold standard of theory. 10
JACQUES: (benignly) It  certainly  is the goal of the  physical sciences,  the hard sciences, if you 
will. The true test of a theory’s validity is its ability to predict. 11
CHARLES: I cannot  agree with  that, for  several reasons. First, much  of what  happens within 
homeland security has more to do with the social than the physical sciences. Second….
GAILE: Let me finish, please. In  addition to descriptive,  explanatory  and predictive, there also 
are normative theories, collections of ideas that say what ought to be done. 
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[Silence; each person thinking about what ought to happen next.]
BARCLAY: (warmly) Quiz time: Give me a homeland security example of each kind of theory.
GAILE: I’ll  start. I maintain  TSA’s twenty  layers of security,  or  whatever the number is,  is an 
example of descriptive theory.12 It  identifies the steps taken  to ensure the safety  of aircraft and 
passengers. In this example, descriptive theory says what something is. 13 
JACQUES: (cheerfully)  Fathali Moghaddam  created a  six-element  theory  he believes explains 
the social and psychological processes that  lead someone to commit  terrorist  acts.14 This theory 
provides information about why something happens, for what reasons. 15  
CHARLES: You  could make the argument  Moghaddam’s model  describes how  – that  is,  the 
mechanisms – not  why – people get  radicalized.  I think  it’s easier  to disrupt  radicalization 
mechanisms than to disrupt motives.
GAILE: (continuing the quiz) You  could use almost  any  homeland security  policy  to illustrate a 
predictive theory.
BARCLAY: (uncertain) I don’t follow your argument.
GAILE: One can  look  at  public  policy  as a prediction based on  an  articulated logic, or  at  least 
one hopes as much.  Practically  all policies take an  “if…then”  form: if you  do what  it says to do in 
a  policy,  then  you  will achieve its desired outcomes.  For  instance, the 2007  HSPD 21  on  public 
health  and medical preparedness includes a  policy  statement  that  says planning  for  catastrophic 
health needs will improve information flow and response during an event.16
BARCLAY: You  are interpreting  “prediction”  too loosely  for  me in that  example. Do you  have 
another, perhaps more traditional example of a predictive theory?
GAILE: Certainly. Take Wilson  and Kelling’s broken  window  theory  from  criminology: 
preventing  small  problems,  like urban  vandalism, helps a  community  prevent  more serious 
crime. 17  You  can  see it  follows the same “if…then”  pattern. Predictive theory  describes how 
something happens, the cause-effect linkages.
BARCLAY: (persistently) What about a homeland security example of predictive theory?
GAILE: This is the point I made earlier;  reducing  crime – like  gang violence – is a  homeland 
security  issue. We don’t  need any  special  homeland security  theory  for  that.  We have perfectly 
respectable theories we can employ.
JACQUES: (agreeably) I believe NIMS is an  example of a  predictive theory  in  homeland 
security.18 If public  safety  practitioners plan  and behave as described in  NIMS doctrine, then 
response to an  event  will be efficient and effective, or  at  least  more so than it would be without 
the structure and procedures NIMS provides. 
GAILE: Perhaps, but I’m  not sure how  you  would test  that.  I think you  could make a  stronger 
case that NIMS is a normative theory. The federal  government  told states and cities they  should 
adopt NIMS. Or they don’t get grant money.  
JACQUES: Maybe NIMS – as theory – is descriptive, explanatory, predictive, and normative.
CHARLES: (contentedly) Thank  you  for  demonstrating the point  I’ve been  trying  to make: once 
you  start  thinking  about  the meaning  of “theory” and the language surrounding  it, the more 
Augean becomes our academic task.
[All nod thoughtfully, pretending to understand what Augean means]
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SCENE 3 - TELLING THE TRUTH ABOUT REALITY
A theory must be tempered with reality. 
- Jawaharlal Nehru 
GAILE: Our  disquisition  reminds me what  E. F. Schumacher’s said about theory: “It’s amazing 
how  much  theory  we can  do without  when work  actually  begins.” 19 I spent twenty  years as a 
public safety  practitioner. I was very  good at  what  I did,  and I don’t recall  one time when 
explicitly using theory made me more effective.
CHARLES: (circumspectly) Without  belittling your  faith  in  pragmatism,  Gaile, doing  what  is 
practical is only one kind of truth.  
GAILE: I realize that.
CHARLES: Searching  for  truth  is a  big  part of our  job.  I'm  probably  going to end up being 
pragmatic: I believe encouraging  everyone to be their  own  theorist  is the ultimate pragmatism. 
But  before I surrender  to your conventional  practitioner  truth,  I think we owe it  to the academic 
part of homeland security to search for a different kind of truth.
BARCLAY: What do you have in mind?
JACQUES: (helpfully)  We could start  with  objective truth,  those things that  cannot  be wished 
away. That may be my all-time favorite definition of truth.
CHARLES: I remember something like that  being  presented as the definition of reality,  not 
truth.20 
JACQUES: (vexed) Reality is the ultimate truth, my friend.
CHARLES: Good bumper  sticker,  Jacques. But  I do not  think it is helpful  in  this discussion.  I 
think objective truth  refers to language that  corresponds to what is being  described – the facts, 
the material reality.21 What is homeland security’s reality? What is the ontological nature of this 
phenomenon we propose to theorize about?
GAILE: (wearily) I do not  think I can  tolerate one more “What is homeland security”  academic 
circle jerk. 22
BARCLAY: "Ontology?" How are you using that word?
CHARLES: (hesitantly) I'm  probably  using  it  incorrectly,  at  least to a  philosopher. But  I mean 
ontology  to refer  to the essential  nature,  the being,  of the phenomenon  under  examination. 
When we use the term  homeland security,  what  – literally  – does it  refer  to? Are we talking 
about  organizations,  activities,  behaviors, missions, strategies,  all of the above,  something 
different? What is this thing we are discussing, as if we understand its ontological nature?
GAILE: (smiling) Ah, the last refuge of the academic: define your terms.
CHARLES: You  can  joke if you'd like,  but  it's more than a  mindless academic exercise.  As I 
reflect  on  the history  of homeland security  it  is clear  to me the term  came first.  The definition 
followed. And the definition  keeps changing because the ontological reality  supporting 
homeland security  is much  more subjective than  it  is objective. The distinction  between those 
two realities is frequently ignored, to our detriment. 
JACQUES: We don’t all  ignore it.  In  my  classes I use something  called the Ontological  Box  to 
talk about homeland security reality.23 
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[Jacques takes a marking pen and draws on the pitted whiteboard.]
JACQUES: (exuberantly) I present  the source of homeland security  reality  as one dimension, 
ranging  from  objective to subjective.  I describe the persistence of that  reality  as a  second 
dimension, ranging from  very  stable to continuously  changing. For  my  analytical convenience,  I 
can  then define homeland security  as four  ideal types:24 a  rational reality,25 a  structural reality, 26 
a group reality,27…
BARCLAY: (supportively) Coherence truth?28
JACQUES: Yes, I think  groups cohere around a  shared understanding  of what reality  is. 
[Returns  to  his  chart.]  And finally,  homeland security  as an individual’s reality. 29  This 
ontological  framework  has sparked energetic discussion.  At  least  in  the classroom. I do 
something  similar  in  class with  the epistemology  of homeland security  – what  counts as data, 
and methods of inquiring into homeland security.30 Let me draw it.
BELLAVITA, WAITING FOR HOMELAND SECURITY THEORY  6
HOMELAND SECURITY AFFAIRS, VOLUME 8  ARTICLE 16 (AUGUST 2012) WWW.HSAJ.ORG
GAILE: (interrupting impatiently) I get  all  that, but  I think  you're making  this “what is 
homeland security”  business way  more difficult  than it  needs to be. I will accept  there may  be 
numerous fringe definitions of homeland security,  but  I think most people in  the community  use 
it  to mean  activities intended to prevent bad things from  happening  – whenever  that's possible, 
and when something disastrous does happen,  to work on  response and recovery.  It's not  that 
hard to understand what homeland security means.
CHARLES: (exactingly) You  said "most people in  the community" use homeland security  the 
way  you  just  described.  I think that  is key. I've looked at  this "community" you  allude to and it 
turns out there are at least half a dozen different communities.
BARCLAY: What kind of communities?
CHARLES:  Language communities. I subscribe to the view  that you  understand the meaning  of 
a  word by  observing  how  it  is used.31  I’ve encountered more than half a  dozen language 
communities that use the term homeland security in a distinct way.32
JACQUES: (gently)  Professor Gaile’s definition  captures the sense of the official  one,  the one 
from  the Department  of Homeland Security  and from  the Quadrennial Homeland Security 
Review report.33 
CHARLES: I don't  know  what  you mean  by  "official." [Charles pauses] Let  me say  that a 
different way. I don't believe the way government uses the word has any privileged status.
GAILE: (perplexed) Goodness.  It’s got  to count for  something. There wouldn't be any  homeland 
security if there were no Department of Homeland Security.
BARCLAY: I think states and cities, especially  those who have experienced terrorist  attacks and 
disasters, might disagree.
GAILE: (yielding) Yes, yes, of course. But you know what I mean.
CHARLES: Again,  this is exactly  what we are talking  about.  If we want  to develop a  theory  of 
homeland security  we have to be clear  what  we mean  by  theory  and what  we mean by  homeland 
security. If we can't  be precise about  that, we at  least have to describe the range of 
understanding available to us.
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[Jaques wipes clean the whiteboard.]
BARCLAY: (amenably) OK,  let’s try  to do that.  To summarize your  position,  Professor Charles, 
as I understand it,  theory  can  mean  anything  from  a  vague hunch  to a  well-specified and 
systematic collection of demonstrable principles and hypotheses. 
CHARLES: Yes.
BARCLAY: And homeland security  can  mean  almost anything from  preventing terrorism, to a 
concentration on all hazards, to... to what else?
CHARLES: To national security,  to managing  slow  moving  catastrophes, and to the fear  that 
government uses homeland security to justify limiting civil liberties.
GAILE: (exasperated) Oh please....
CHARLES: You  may  not  agree with  it,  but  it  is one of the language communities in  homeland 
security.
GAILE: (forcibly) Let  me summarize my  position. To develop a  theory  of homeland security  you 
first  decide what theory  means.  You  make a  decision  about what  most  reasonable people in your 
profession mean by  theory  and use that  understanding.  You  include a  footnote to explain  you 
understand there are lots of definitions of theory, but  you  pick  one credible and defensible 
definition of theory to move the process along.
JACQUES: I agree,  provisionally. And you  can do the same thing  for  deciding  what  homeland 
security means. Just make sure that it is credible and defensible.
GAILE: (assenting) I will concede there are competing  definitions of homeland security.  Even  if 
some of them  strain  the absurd. However, if our  theory-building  project  is to be productive, we 
need to simply  decide what  we mean  by  homeland security.  So I am  going with  the definition 
that appears in the official documents.
CHARLES: Fortunately, we do not  have to agree. I understand your  position  and I disagree with 
it.
BARCLAY: Why?
CHARLES: As I said, I think the position surrenders too quickly to pragmatism.
JACQUES: It’s not idealistic enough for you?
CHARLES: If you are referring to Plato’s image in Raphael's School of Athens.... 34
JACQUES: I am.
CHARLES: I suppose I am  being  idealistic  in  that  sense.  But if academics can't  seek  as pure a 
truth as possible, who can?35
Now, what I want is, Facts. Teach these boys and girls nothing but Facts. Facts alone are 
wanted in life. Plant nothing else. And root out everything else. You can only form the minds of 
reasoning animals upon Facts: nothing else will ever be of any service to them. This is the principle on 
which I bring up my own children, and this is the principle on which I bring up these children. Stick to 
Facts, sir! – Charles Dickens (Hard Times)
If facts conflict with a theory, either the theory must be changed or the facts. – Benedict Spinoza
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ACT 2
 A country road.  




SCENE 1 - SELLING THE TRUTH TO REALITY
I can’t stand theory because it is imposed by the intellectual. And the intellectual is, by definition, not 
a creative person. The intellectual is a person who talks about the creative process, but often doesn’t 
understand it. 
– Mary Pratt
GAILE: (defensively)  Not  that  my  view  needs defending, but don't  forget  our  students in  all  of 
this. They  come to our  programs because they  want  to be practical women  and men, involved in 
the daily  world of politics,  organizations, budgets, and getting  real work done.  They  want  to 
make a positive difference in society. 
JACQUES: I agree completely.  Some of us may  have the luxury  of being  in  a  fully  funded 
department. But  the rest of us are in  a  market. People come to our  programs because we 
increase their  chances of getting  a  job  once they  graduate.  We are not  going  to draw  many 
customers by  offering  an  exegesis about the ontology  of homeland security. Students want  the 
knowledge and skills they need to prevent terrorism and to respond to disasters.
BARCLAY: We are wandering again from our theory discussion.
GAILE: (insistently)  No we’re not.  We have an  obligation  to our students and to our  emerging 
profession to be practical. Yes, we need to demonstrate that  we have a theoretical  foundation  for 
what  we teach  and research. We also need to show  what  we teach  has practical consequences in 
the real world, that our ideas help make the nation more secure.
CHARLES: (compliantly) You and I are in complete agreement here, Gaile.
GAILE: I doubt that.
JACQUES: I second that doubt.
CHARLES: (disappointedly) Hear  me out. I’m  all for where you  want  to end up.  I simply  believe 
what I have to offer is a much more practical and theoretical perspective than you provide.
BARCLAY: "A  practical theoretical perspective?" Aren’t  you  being  inconsistent  and 
contradictory?
CHARLES: (conciliatorily) If that's what  you’re hearing,  then  the error rests in  my  inability  to 
articulate my  position  clearly  enough.  I think  you  get  to pragmatism  – that is,  to what works – 
through idealism.
GAILE: Then what do you mean by idealism?
CHARLES: Platonic ideal  stuff; it’s about the search  for  pure forms.  That's why  I'm  approaching 
the theory  discussion  first from  a  philosophical position.  I do think  philosophy  can  be very 
practical.
GAILE: (shrugging)  You are being  pedantically  reductionist. Like Descartes,  you  appear  to want 
everything broken down to the level of what each syllable means.36 
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CHARLES: (softly) I would rather  say  that a  different  way. I believe  I’m  being  more holistic than 
reductionist. 37 I want  to start theory  building  from  the level  of each  individual who wants to 
participate in this process. I want  each  person  to be treated as an  end unto himself or  herself, 
and I want  to see what theories emerge from  a  community  of people who think  and behave that 
way.  
[Charles looks around unsuccessfully for something to sit on.]
BARCLAY: I would like to return  to your assertion: you  get  to the practical in  homeland security 
through the ideal. What do you mean by that?
CHARLES: (keenly)  Earlier  in  our  conversation,  Professor  Gaile made claims about  what  theory 
means and what  homeland security  means.  I will assume the assertions resulted from  a 
thoughtful review of the literature on both topics.
GAILE: Yes, from  the literature and from  my  practical experience. I've spent years thinking 
about these issues and I came to my conclusions deliberately.
CHARLES: You  have the knowledge and skills that allow  you  to do that.  We all do. At  least  all of 
us at this table. 
JACQUES:  So you want to turn everyone into PhDs?
CHARLES: (pleased) An  intriguing  idea.  But  there are  few  enough  jobs as it  is.  I'm  not sure we 
need to spawn many more of us. Replacement reproduction should be enough.
BARCLAY: Back to the topic please.
CHARLES: (adamantly) We don't  need to create more PhDs. We do need to teach  our  students 
the skills they  need to be their  own  theorists in  a  homeland security  world imbued – for  as long 
as any  of us can  see  – with  ambiguity  and uncertainty.  That's partially  behind my  desire to have 
anyone interested in homeland security be their own theorists.
BARCLAY: To be consistent here, how are you using theory?
CHARLES: (intently) It does not  actually  matter.  I am  willing  to accept everything from  hunch 
to inviolate law.  The output  from  a particular  theorist  is not  as important  to me as the process 
used to develop a  theory  – whether  derived inductively, deductively,  dialectically, abductively, 
through  detour, multiple realities, open  systems – it  does not  matter  to me.38 The “let everyone 
be a  theorist”  approach  works if people are willing  to share  their  ideas – and to the degree they 
can, their reasons – openly. That is the process that does matter to me.
BARCLAY: (querulously) You’re merely restating what scientists are supposed to do.
CHARLES: No.  I’m  trying  to say  theorizing about  homeland security  is too important to be 
restricted to the academic patriciate. The activity should be open to all. 39
SCENE 2 – NOTHING IS MORE PRACTICAL
Science is an essentially anarchic enterprise: theoretical anarchism is more humanitarian and more 
likely to encourage progress than its law-and-order alternatives…. The only principle that does not 
inhibit progress is: anything goes. 
– Paul Feyerabend
JACQUES: (haltingly) You place a lot of faith in critical thinking.
CHARLES: Yes. It is my single vice.
GAILE: And by  critical thinking  you  mean  looking at the assumptions underpinning  the ideas 
generated by your creative free-for-all?
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CHARLES: (impatiently)  Of course.  Assumptions and assertions. Our  maxim  should be "What 
is your claim about homeland security and why should anyone believe you?"40
 BARCLAY: So you  envision  a  world where everyone in  homeland security  walks around uttering 
theories?
CHARLES: That world is already here. Except maybe for the muttering part. 
BARCLAY: (prickly) I said “uttering.”
CHARLES:  (dismissively) Whatever. Theorists are all  around us.  Show  me a homeland security 
practitioner who's any good at their work, and I will show you a good theorist.
GAILE: (examining) What about practitioners who aren't very good? Bad theorists?
CHARLES: (considering) I would like to think  more about that  question, but you  probably  could 
say  that.  If someone is ineffective  at their  work, that  person’s theory  about  how  to get something 
done is likely incorrect.  
GAILE: (absorbed in a memory)  There is nothing like failure to make you  question  your 
operating theories.  
JACQUES: I have a basic problem with your “show me a good practitioner” argument.
CHARLES: In  a  moment, please.  Let me add one more piece. This surprised me: In  my 
experience, good practitioners are  almost  always unable to describe their  effectiveness from  a 
theoretical perspective. They are effective, but they cannot explain why.
BARCLAY: (aridly)  As Chris Argyris demonstrated, when  they  do offer  a  description  it 
frequently differs from what they actually do.41
CHARLES: True. Since our  classroom  task  is fundamentally  about  teaching  people how  to learn, 
rather than what to learn... 
JACQUES: (surprised) Pardon me?
CHARLES: … teaching  critical  thinking  is key  to what we do. If you're  a  good critical thinker  you 
should be able to construct  your  own theories about homeland security,  and subject those claims 
to the same critical analysis used to create  the claim. This is where other  people enter  the 
process.  Presumably, if there were flaws in  your  theory  you  would have found them. Talking 
with  others is a  way  to test your  ideas,  to check for  errors,  as it  were. Done correctly,  especially 
with people who disagree with you, what I suggest holds the potential to transform ideas. 42
[A pause for silence. No one wants to speak next.]
BARCLAY: Professor  Jacques,  you  said you did not  agree that  good practitioners are good 
theorists?
JACQUES: (restlessly) Some practitioners may  be good theorists, but  I don't  think  that helps us 
much  in constructing  and teaching homeland security  theories.  The idea  that  everyone should 
be their  own  theorist  might work if the everyone you're talking  about  is an accomplished 
professional. It's not going  to work if you're teaching  a  room  full of inexperienced undergraduate 
students.
CHARLES: Now it's my turn to disagree with you.
JACQUES: (irritably)  And my  turn  to ask you  to allow  me to finish. I also think you’re incorrect 
believing we should not  be teaching  students what to learn. You  obviously  have not  spent  much 
time with undergraduates.
CHARLES: (implacably) You  are making  claims about inexperienced undergraduates.  I think 
you should provide some evidence to support your assertions.
JACQUES: How  about  more than  a  decade teaching  homeland security  to undergraduates.  Is 
that evidence enough for you?
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GAILE: (mildly) That's my  experience also. Students need foundational knowledge before they 
can act or theorize effectively. We teach foundations. 
BARCLAY: (peremptorily) We are far  from  what  we started talking about: can  there be a  theory 
of homeland security?
GAILE: (emending) A grand theory.
BARCLAY: Yes,  can  there be a  grand theory? Charles used to think so,  but  has now  abandoned 
that search. Gaile says probably not. Jacques says…what?
JACQUES: My  view  is there can  be a  grand theory  of homeland security.  In  fact I would like to 
propose one.
GAILE: (insistently) Before you do that,  I’d like to slightly  modify  Professor  Barclay’s summary. 
There may  be a  grand theory  out there somewhere. But  in  my  view  we can make more progress 
as a  discipline by  focusing  on  mid-range theories, on  theories that  try  to describe or  explain  a 
more manageable subset  of homeland security: like preparedness,  domestic intelligence, ethics, 
transportation  security  – the list  of topics is almost  without  end.  And, I will add again, the case 
has not been  argued to my  satisfaction  that  we need unique homeland security  theories to make 
progress. Existing academic disciplines and professions have a lot to offer us. 43  
CHARLES: (confidently)  Please note  how  we are getting slightly  closer  to my  position  that  we 
should encourage everyone to be their  own  theorists.  We have expanded membership in our 
clerisy  from  homeland security  academics,  to now  include academics in  ancillary  disciplines, 
and maybe even  practitioners. If you  can  only  see your  way  to dismantle your  irredentist  wall a 
bit more….
GAILE: That’s silly.  And not  just because you  are trying  to get  away  with  using  “clerisy”  and 
“irredentist.” 
BARCLAY: (to no one) Was that another dentist reference?
GAILE: (to Charles) You  are  ignoring  that  it  takes a  certain amount of training  and knowledge 
to theorize effectively.  Academics are especially  good at  theory  building, especially  academics 
who have been homeland security practitioners.
JACQUES: Like you, Gaile.
GAILE: Yes, and like you, Jacques.
SCENE 3 – CONTRIVED FOOTHOLDS 
Knowledge is not a series of self consistent theories that converges toward an ideal view; it is rather 
an ever increasing ocean of mutually incompatible (and perhaps even incommensurable) alternatives, 
each single theory, each fairytale, each myth that is part of the collection forcing the others into greater 
articulation and all of them contributing, via this process of competition, to the development of our 
consciousness. 
– Paul Feyerabend
BARCLAY: (reflectively) Here is where I think  we are in  the discussion. We have two, perhaps 
three positions represented on  the issue of developing  homeland security  theory. The left 
position....
CHARLES: What do you mean by left?
BARCLAY: Well,  what  you’re saying  sounds left-libertarian  to me: individuals should create 
their  own rules. As opposed to the more right-leaning  conservative position of adhering  to 
traditional rules about making theory.
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CHARLES: (fractiously) I don't see libertarian being the same thing as left.
BARCLAY: But for the purpose of this conversation?
CHARLES: I think my  position  is more anarchistic – in  a good way  – than  left  or  libertarian.  But 
please don’t let my truth get in the way of your analysis.
BARCLAY: (disregarding) As I was saying,  the  left position  is to question  everything: the 
meaning  of theory,  of homeland security,  of inquiry,  of what  counts as data,  and so on.  Everyone 
creates their  own  theory  and shares those ideas with  everyone else, modifying the theories as 
needed. Rather than having one dominant  theory  about  homeland security,  one looks for  as 
many ideas as possible and subjects them to the crucible of critical analysis. 44
CHARLES: (acceding)  That  is an accurate representation  of the substance of my  argument.  I 
would add that  ideas – we can  call them  theories – would be evaluated continuously  both 
through  critical analysis and – because our  field of study  aims to be practical – the real world 
test. Eventually, conclusions we reach need to be verifiable, repeatable, and falsifiable.
JACQUES: (quietly) That's simply the requirements of basic science.45
BARCLAY:  Here's what I think of as the position on the right.  It  is a  pragmatic view  that says 
we, as scholars,  need to operationalize terms like theory  and homeland security.  Bite the bullet 
and announce what  we mean  by  those terms and why,  then  develop and test  theories from  that 
foundation.  Realize there are alternative meanings for  many  of the core terms,  but select 
meaning  from  what most  informed and knowledgeable people would say  are reasonable 
understandings of those words.
GAILE: (approvingly) Although I continue to question  the need for unique homeland security 
theory, I agree with  your  summary.  I think  that approach  gives us a  much  firmer,  more 
manageable basis to use or  create  theories that advance our understanding  of homeland 
security.
JACQUES: What  Professor  Barclay  characterized as the position  on the right  is also how  regular 
science proceeds: define terms, state and test hypotheses, report results. 46
CHARLES: (dispassionately) I think  what Barclay’s synthesis has done is illustrate how  one 
arrives at  a  coherence theory  of truth: work  with  people who share your  basic assumptions about 
theory  and homeland security.  I am  also seeking  coherence truth.  I simply  want to allow  more 
people to participate in the conversation. 
[Three people pause. They look at each other through the darkness.]
GAILE: (implacably) Barclay, you said there are possibly three positions? 
BARCLAY: Yes, I thought  if there is a  far  left and extreme right, there should be a  middle 
position.  (forgetfully)  But whatever  it  was apparently  slipped my  mind. Would anyone care to 
state it?
JACQUES: (reservedly) I think I might  represent that position. I believe it's possible to have a 
grand theory  of homeland security, and I think  I have one.  But  to get  there, I have to make 
several assumptions about the terms I use and what  counts for  me as evidence to support  the 
theory.
CHARLES: How is that a third position?
JACQUES: (pensively) I'm  not  certain. When  scientists want  to understand something they 
cannot see, they  create a  model  of what they  believe the phenomenon  is.  They  test  and modify 
that  model as necessary. In  that sense, I think I “see”  how  all of homeland security  works. I 
believe the model  I have to present  combines rigor  with  flexibility,  and precision  with 
interpretation. I offer  it  as a  grand theory  of homeland security. I'm  not sure if that's a  left 
position, a center position, or a right position. 
BARCLAY:  Why don't you tell us your model and let us decide? 
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There is a theory which states that if ever for any reason anyone discovers what exactly the Universe is 
for and why it is here it will instantly disappear and be replaced by something even more bizarre and 
inexplicable. There is another that states that this has already happened. – Douglas Adam
ACT 3
A country road.  
A wooden table.  
A small whiteboard.
Toward dawn.
SCENE 1 – PRODUCING HOMELAND SECURITY
A theory has only the alternative of being right or wrong.  A model has a third possibility: it may be 
right, but irrelevant.
 – Manfred Eigen
JACQUES: Like many  research  projects, I start  with  a  question I want to answer: What did it 
take to produce the homeland security enterprise? I formulated the question  so I would not 
have to define what I meant by homeland security or enterprise.47  
GAILE: How did you do that?
JACQUES: In  my  opinion anyone who cares about the subject already  has a  preferred definition 
of “homeland security”  and “enterprise.”  So rather  than  trying  to get everyone to agree with  the 
definition  I like,  I contend this theory  will work for  any  definition  of homeland security  and any 
definition of the homeland security enterprise.
CHARLES: (inviting) How are you using "theory" in your formulation?
JACQUES: I'm  not sure yet. My  ideas are partly  drawn from  established frameworks, and partly 
from  intuition. But I think the mash-up I end with  works at  the levels of descriptive, 
explanatory, predictive, and normative theory.
GAILE: (judiciously) It  sounds to me as if you  will  be explaining.  If you  start by  asking  what  it 
took  to produce the homeland security  enterprise, you're seeking  an  explanation.  You  want  to 
know the mechanisms that created what we presently have.
JACQUES: My  hunch  is if we can  answer  what I am  calling  the "production" question, we can 
understand what forces brought us to where we are now  in the homeland security  enterprise.  If 
we understand those forces, we should be able to use that  knowledge to move the enterprise 
toward a certain direction.
CHARLES: (attentively) I would like  to note how  your formulation  depends on  the Newtonian 
metaphors of force and direction.  There are alternatives to that approach. But  I will withhold a 
bit until I hear you out.
GAILE: (sententiously) Your  force metaphor  reminds me of an  aphorism: the pessimist  curses 
the wind, the optimist hopes it will change, and the realist adjusts his sails. 48 
JACQUES: I like that.  It  captures what  I'm  trying  to say. If we can  understand what  it  took  to 
produce the homeland security  enterprise, we can  adjust our  sails to take the enterprise where 
we want it to go. And by “we,” I mean theorists and reflective practitioners. 49
BARCLAY: (redirecting) Do you have an answer to your production question?
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JACQUES: Yes.  My  answer  is complicated, but let  me state it  and then  try  to unpack  it. Here’s 
what  I conclude: It  took an event significant enough to activate the issue attention  cycle in 
homeland security.  Once it  was activated,  the cycle continued to complete the pattern.  Said 
another way,  the homeland security  enterprise is the second order consequence of the issue 
attention  cycle.  Multiple cycles, actually.  The activation and unfolding  of those cycles produced 
the homeland security enterprise we have today.
BARCLAY: I do not understand anything you just said.
GAILE: (helpfully) I think I do. The issue attention cycle is an  idea  Jacques has applied to 
homeland security. 50 The cycle describes what happens after  a  major event.  There's a  public 
clamor to do something immediately; people eventually  realize how  difficult it  will be to fix  the 
problem; then they subsequently lose interest. The cycle restarts with the next event.
JACQUES: That’s the basic idea,  but I see it slightly  differently.  [Jacques  draws on the 
whiteboard] I envision seven  stages in  the cycle: pre-event,  the actual event,  alarm, demand, 
awareness of difficulty, changing priorities, and then finally the post-event period.51
BARCLAY: Can you give an example of the cycle?
JACQUES: (affably)  There are plenty  of examples,  from  the 9/11  attacks onward.  But let  me say 
more about why I think this is a grand theory. 52
BARCLAY: Please do.
JACQUES: I think  everyone at  this table would agree a significant part of the homeland security 
enterprise is complex, regardless how you conceptualize the enterprise. 
CHARLES: What do you mean by….
JACQUES: I mean  complex  in  the technical  sense, not  the common  language meaning  of that 
word. 53
CHARLES: You anticipate my question.
JACQUES: My mind may not work as quickly as yours, Professor Charles, but it does work.
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CHARLES: (bowing) My apologies.
JACQUES: (continuing)  Not  every  aspect  of homeland security  is complex. But  I believe we 
would all agree the homeland security  enterprise consists of countless agencies, people,  levels of 
government,  the private sector, nongovernmental  organizations,  citizens, and even  other 
countries.54
GAILE:  Agreed. Homeland security is much more than the Department of Homeland Security. 
JACQUES: (avidly)  Imagine if you will multiple issue attention  cycles operating simultaneously 
but asynchronously  within  the homeland security  enterprise. And if you  picture the enterprise 
populated with  numerous agents, interacting  with  each  other  within multiple and variably 
constrained rule-based systems, you see an image of exceptional complexity.
BARCLAY: I'm not following any of that.
CHARLES: (construing)  Professor  Jacques has shifted from  a  Newtonian  paradigm  to a 
Darwinian  one. Even  though Jacques talks about  forces and directions, I hear  descriptions of an 
ecosystem: many life forms seeking a niche in the homeland security environment.55
GAILE: (disputing)  I'm  hearing  something less organic.  It's as if the homeland security 
enterprise consisted of lots of hydrogen  and oxygen  atoms,  combining  together  under  various 
atmospheric conditions to produce a single cloud, a weather system, or a hurricane.
JACQUES: (delightedly) Both  metaphors come close.  I'm  saying  the homeland security 
enterprise is the continuously  emerging product of a  complex  adaptive system. 56 It's a  system 
that  is energized by  activity  surrounding  an  initiating  event  – typically  a  mega  event people view 
as threatening the security  and maybe even  the existence of the United States.  The system 
sustains its energy  by  trying  to solve or  contain  the problems triggered by  the event, and by 
responding to the opportunities revealed by the event.57
[They pause.  Early light touches the horizon.]
SCENE 2 – TRUTH THAT IS LIVED, NOT TAUGHT
He who loves practice without theory is like the sailor who boards ship without a rudder and 
compass and never knows where he may cast. 
– Leonardo da Vinci
CHARLES: Will you entertain questions about your grand homeland security theory?
JACQUES: (cautiously) Of course.
CHARLES: If we agree one function  of theory  is to describe a  phenomenon, would you  say  your 
issue cycle theory describes homeland security?
JACQUES: (deliberately)  For  the purposes of building and testing  theory,  yes.  I think it  is 
possible to use the framework I offer  to identify  homeland security  problems that  resist  solution, 
generate questions about those problems,  create hypotheses about  solutions,  and then  test those 
hypotheses. So yes, one can build a research agenda around the framework I offer.
BARCLAY: (respectfully) You’re answering a  different  question.  I think  you've moved directly 
into theory’s problem  solving  potential.  Professor  Charles asked about its power  as a  descriptive 
framework.
JACQUES: I think  you  could use the framework  to describe the history  of homeland security. 
That  would demonstrate  the theory’s descriptive power. One could start  with homeland security 
version  1.0 – the September  11, 2001  attacks. It  then  evolved to version  2.0  – Katrina  and the 
discovery  of all  hazards.  Version  3.0 arrived with  H1N1  and the widespread acceptance of public 
health professionals into the enterprise. In  Version 4.0,  the newly  elected Obama 
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Administration  absorbed homeland security  into national security.  Version  5.0  arrived with  the 
Great Recession  and is marked by  the awareness of fiscal  limits, by  programmatic  retrenchment, 
and by  a  diminished threat of terrorism. 58 At the most  macro level, it  is possible to describe how 
significant events trigger change in  homeland security.  But  to me that  is not especially 
interesting or useful.
CHARLES: (nodding) I agree with you: it’s not particularly  interesting  or  useful.  But at  the risk 
of turning this into the homeland security  equivalent of the Glass Bead Game, 59 allow  me the 
second question you have already anticipated. Talk about the explanatory power of your theory.
JACQUES: (circumspectly) I think the framework can  be used to explain  why  Hurricane Katrina 
shifted attention  in  the homeland security  enterprise toward all hazards and away  from 
terrorism.60 The issue-attention  pattern  triggered by  Katrina  in 2005  dampened interest  in  a 
domestic terrorist threat  that  had declined substantially  since 2001.  The failed attempt by  the 
underwear  bomber  in  2009  sped the implementation  of body  scanners.61 The meltdown of the 
US financial  markets related directly,  in  my  view, to the reduction in Urban  Area  Security 
Initiative grants. 62 I believe one could build a  long  list of examples explaining  how  the enterprise 
has evolved. But I think ultimately we care about explaining so we can make predictions.
GAILE: Yes. I think we agree that’s the ultimate value of a practical homeland security theory.63
[One person yawns. One stretches. One spots a morning star.]
JACQUES: (discomfited)  Prediction is where I run  into problems. As I said earlier, some but not 
all,  parts of the homeland security  enterprise are complex.  I don’t think  it’s possible to predict 
with  any  precision the outputs of a  complex  adaptive system.  Metaphorically, it is similar  to the 
difficulties quantum  physics encounters.  One can  describe the range of probable outcomes for 
an  event, but  one cannot  predict  a  specific  outcome. 64 I want to argue that  prediction  is possible 
for  some aspects of the enterprise,  but not for  other parts.  To support that  part  of my  theory, 
and to show  where prediction  in  homeland security  is possible and where it  is not, I need to 
present a supporting framework.65
JACQUES: This is the cynefin framework.  
CHARLES: I know that.
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JACQUES: It  helps me make sense of the homeland security  environment in a  way  that 
contributes to explanation, prediction  and normative guidance.  I believe different  stages of the 
homeland security issue attention cycle activate different aspects of the cynefin framework. 
BARCLAY: How are you spelling that word? I've never heard of it.
JACQUES: C-y-n-e-f-i-n, pronounced "Ku-nev-in." 
BARCLAY: What does it mean?
CHARLES: (interrupting)  It’s a  Welsh  word that  roughly  translates into the place of your 
multiple realities; it describes the relationship among people, experience, and contexts.66  
BARCLAY: I'm still not clear what the word means.
CHARLES: (yielding) Neither am I. But I find the framework occasionally useful.
JACQUES: I think  it  is a  good description of the world I'm  trying  to portray. Homeland security 
is a place of multiple realities. 
GAILE:  I've read about the term, but I'm not convinced I know what it means.
JACQUES: I've heard Snowden – who coined the term – lecture about it. 67  
CHARLES: There is a YouTube video that describes it.68 
JACQUES: (apologetically) I’m  going  to be pedantic  again,  but  I want  to outline my 
understanding  of cynefin.  We start  first  with  a  system,  defined as any  network that coheres 
around something – like an issue or mission – and agents who operate within the system.
BARCLAY: Agents?
JACQUES: I mean  people,  organizations,  policies, doctrines,  rules – anything  around which  a 
system  can  form. Systems can be ordered, complex or  chaotic.  Ordered systems are further 
divided into simple and complicated. Let me draw it for you.
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SCENE 3 – PATTERNS WITHOUT VALUES
Whenever a theory appears to you as the only possible one, take this as a sign that you have neither 
understood the theory nor the problem it was intended to solve. 
– Karl Popper
BARCLAY: How are all these boxes useful?
CHARLES: (helpfully insistent)  If I may.  First  of all,  they  are not boxes.  They  represent 
phenomenological spaces.  The point  is to ask what  an  issue would look like from  each 
perspective. Some answers work better than others.
JACQUES: One’s phenomenological choice has consequences for  how  one understands the 
source of order. The order of simple systems comes from known cause-and-effect relationships. 
CHARLES: As an example, consider  one of the Department of Homeland Security  payroll 
systems: submit your timesheet and out comes a paycheck. That is a simple system.69 
JACQUES: Another  simple system  could be the procedures you  follow  going  through airport 
security: show  your  boarding pass,  show  your  identification, put  your  belongings on  the 
conveyer  belt,  take your shoes and belt off,  remove your computer, empty  your  pockets, stand 
inside the body  scanner,  raise your hands in  the universal gesture of surrender,  move forward 
when  you  are instructed,  and so on. Simple systems are governed by  rules,  like standard 
operating  procedures.  They  are  derived from  empirical demonstrations that  the outcomes one 
wants can be obtained by following explicit procedures. 
CHARLES: (injecting) The order  in  a  complicated system, if I may  continue, comes through 
research. You  don't  start  out knowing  what  to do in  a  particular  situation  – such as how  to 
process the massive amount of data suspicious activity reports generate70 – but you can learn. 
JACQUES: Determining  how  to identify  and protect  the critical  nodes in  a  multi-state power 
grid is another  example of a  complicated homeland security  problem. Eventually,  research  can 
lead to solutions that become standard operating procedures.   
CHARLES: In a complicated system, order is knowable and sustainable.
JACQUES: Both  simple and complicated systems are governed by  known or knowable cause and 
effect relationships. That’s where their order comes from.
GAILE: (losing interest) I do not see how this is related to building a homeland security theory.
JACQUES: Sorry, I can get too far  into the weeds.  What  I'm  trying  to do is describe the 
phenomenological space that is homeland security,  using  the cynefin framework  to illustrate 
ways of making sense of that space.
BARCLAY: (incuriously) I'm put off by the word space. It's jargon I'm not comfortable with.
GAILE: I don't have a  problem  with  space.  It's just another  way  to describe the homeland 
security enterprise.
CHARLES: Whether you  call it  the homeland security  space or  the enterprise, I don’t  want us to 
miss the significant point here: we four  are making  up what we mean  by  words like enterprise 
and space through our conversation. We are acting as if these words point to something real.
GAILE: (amending) Socially constructing reality?71
CHARLES: Yes, I believe so. Our conversation  provides another  example of how  coherence truth 
works. Some parts of homeland security  may  be governed by  objective truth,  others by 
pragmatic truth.  But  in my  view, the more we talk  about this nebulous theory-building  project 
among  ourselves, and the more we identify  and resolve our  differences, the closer  we get  to 
coherence truth about homeland security theory.
BARCLAY: (reengaging) Meaning?
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GAILE: It’s what Richard Rorty said: Truth is what your colleagues let you get away with.72
CHARLES: I suspect  if there is ever  to be a dominant  theory  of homeland security, it  will be 
based more on coherence truth  than pragmatic or  objective truth. I predict  that  one of the many 
language communities in  homeland security  will  come to some agreement  about  what 
constitutes an  accepted theory.  I say  more power  to whomever  is able to accomplish that.  At 
least  that will  provide something  tangible for  other  language communities to engage.  We can 
then  get  a  healthy  dialectic  going  over  the substance of homeland security  theory,  and move past 
the how-to make-a theory discussion. 73
JACQUES: (dismissing, gently) Maybe,  but let me continue talking about  cynefin. I described 
the simple and the complicated systems. I think  homeland security,  writ  large, has a  fairly  good 
understanding  of simple and complicated problems. Simple problems are handled by  standard 
operating procedures, and complicated problems are addressed through research.74 
CHARLES: (magnanimously) I like where you're going  with  this. Most  of the simple and 
complicated problems in  homeland security  are solved or  are being adequately  managed 
through research.
JACQUES: I think  I just  said that.  I have not  done the empirical work to support  those claims. 
But  with some exceptions I believe that is the case. So my  grand theory  takes into consideration 
that  many  of homeland security’s technical  and administrative problems are fairly  well specified, 
and as a result approachable through mid-range theories.
BARCLAY: Such as?
JACQUES: (carefully) Again, I have not done the empirical  work yet,  but  I suspect  issues like 
border  entry  procedures,  finding  handguns in  carry-on  luggage, monitoring  the movement of 
maritime shipping  containers fit this category. FEMA instructions for conducting  planning  and 
exercises may be another example.  
CHARLES:  Your examples are no-brainers from a theoretical perspective.
JACQUES: Conceptually,  perhaps.  But working  out  the details,  say, of detecting  a radiological 
signal in a port that has hundreds of thousands of containers can be daunting.
BARCLAY: (impatiently) What about the complex and chaotic parts of the cynefin framework?
JACQUES: Those domains describe activity  where order  emerges.  Cause and effect  relationships 
can be known, but almost always it's after the fact, after an event has happened.  
[Gaile picks small stones from the ground and arches them toward the horizon.]
JACQUES: In  my  reading  of homeland security's history, the changes,  the  big  changes,  have 
always been around events that are not going to happen the same way again.
BARCLAY: You are talking about black swans?
JACQUES: (studiedly)  I don’t  think I would call  them  black swans.75 Hurricane Katrina certainly 
was predictable  and predicted.  So too was using  an  airplane as a  terrorist weapon,  and the 
likelihood of a  pandemic.  But  recall  my  central  thesis: the homeland security  enterprise was 
produced by  events that  initiated and sustained multiple issue attention  cycles.  I think one could 
agree that  events surrounding  complex and chaotic activity  are largely  responsible for  the 
general  shape and direction  of the enterprise. Activities in  the simple  and complicated domains 
sustain that shape and direction. They  may  tinker  with  the shape at the margins, but they  do not 
significantly alter it. Especially not in comparison to significant events.
GAILE: Perhaps the lack  of significant difference between  the Bush Administration’s Homeland 
Security  Presidential Directive 8  and the Obama  Administration’s Presidential Preparedness 
Directorate 8 illustrates your “tinkering with the shape” idea?76
JACQUES: It might be. But I don't know enough about either to have an opinion.
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BARCLAY: (disquieted) I don't  understand yet  how  you  are distinguishing between  complex and 
chaotic in your formulation.
JACQUES: In  a  chaotic system,  there is no discernible cause and effect pattern.  Agents are 
independent and largely unconstrained.  
CHARLES: There is a  chilling  scene in the Jules and Gedeon  Naudet  video about September 
11th.  It  is the moment firefighters become aware the building is coming  down  around them. 77 
That is chaos. Everything surprises. No one rules. Except maybe the laws of physics. 
JACQUES:  In a  complex  system, as I think we discussed earlier,  order  emerges retrospectively. 
We can  discover  cause effect relationships,  but we only  know  them  after  the fact; and the 
relationships never recur.  
GAILE: That’s similar  to Churchill’s conclusion about history: the study  of things that  never 
happen the same way twice.
JACQUES: A  complex  system  constrains the freedom  agents have to act, but  not as much  as 
simple or  complicated systems. Agents can  modify  a  complex  system  through interacting  with 
each other and with the system. 78
GAILE: An  example would be how  public  health  and other  agencies learned to distribute 
vaccines during the 2009  H1N1  pandemic.79 Or  how  the Deepwater  Horizon  event moved first 
from  the chaos of the explosion, to the complexity  of the response, to the complicated task  of 
stopping the leak, to the – comparatively speaking – simple job of clean up.80  
JACQUES: Yes, good examples. But before this gets even more complicated...
BARCLAY: (smiling) Or complex?
JACQUES: Right.  I don’t  want to lose sight  of the forest.  Before this explanation  gets into even 
more details, let me restate my  theoretical  claim. I start  with  the question: What  did it  take to 
produce the homeland security  enterprise? I argue it took  the activation  and unfolding of the 
homeland security  issue attention  cycle. I present a  tentative description  of the stages of that 
cycle. 
BARCLAY: (reassured) OK, I follow all that.
JACQUES: Now, please allow me one more drawing.  
[Jacques erases the board and begins to write.]
JACQUES: I maintain  each  stage in the issue attention  cycle tends to evoke particular 
phenomenological characteristics.  Each  stage provides opportunities to make sense of a 
situation  in  a  different  way.81 I use the four  elements of the cynefin  framework  as a  convenient 
way to highlight – with an X – those opportunities.
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SCENE 4 – ESCAPING FROM OLD IDEAS
All the limitative Theorems of metamathematics and the theory of computation suggest that once the 
ability to represent your own structure has reached a certain critical point, that is the kiss of death: it 
guarantees you can never represent yourself totally.  Godel’s Incompleteness Theorem, Church’s 
Undecidability Theorem, Turing’s Halting Problem, Turski’s Truth Theorem will always have the 
[flavor] of some ancient fairy tale which warns you that “To seek self-knowledge is to embark on a 
journey…which will always be incomplete, cannot be charted on a map, will never halt, cannot be 
described.” 
– Douglas Hofstadter
GAILE: I don’t want to be too much of a Philistine, but tell us the "so what" from all this?
JACQUES: (hesitantly) I'm  still working  on  that, but  I think  one could fill in  the chart  for  a 
variety  of decisions that  have to be made during the cycle: decisions about communication, 
strategy,  planning, technology,  leadership,  and so on. For  instance, there are certain leadership 
styles that are appropriate for some stages of the cycle and inappropriate for others.82 
GAILE: So it should be possible to use your cycle theory to generate testable hypotheses?
JACQUES: (confidently) Yes,  let me use leadership as an  example.  During  a  catastrophe – let’s 
say,  like Deepwater  Horizon  – I would expect to see leaders who used behaviors suitable for 
chaotic events to be more effective than leaders who followed standard operating procedures.83 
BARCLAY: And leaders would tend to be ineffective  if they  used complexity  strategies in 
situations where following routine procedures is the appropriate behavior?
JACQUES: Yes.   As an  example,  responding  to a wildland fire using  something  other than the 
Incident Command System  would be a  mistake,  and would be contrary  to the strategy 
appropriate for a routine – at least in this context – disaster. 
CHARLES: (obdurately) Your  framework,  while vaguely  interesting, does seem  to be a  rehash  – 
sorry, maybe not  the best word – of something leadership and organizational theorists already 
understand quite well: different situations require different behaviors.
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JACQUES: (protectively) I think I am  providing  more than  a  restatement of contingency 
theory.84 I think  I have an  accurate descriptive theory  of what  it  took  to produce the homeland 
security  enterprise.  I also believe it  explains how  the enterprise evolves: multiple stakeholders 
interacting within systems created by overlapping and multiple issue attention cycles.  
[Jacques half-heartedly erases the board]
JACQUES: The enterprise includes simple and complicated dimensions. Occasionally  – and 
significantly  – chaos happens. But I think  the most  interesting  and uncontrollable parts of the 
enterprise reside within  complexity. My  grand theory  suggests combining issue attention  with 
the cynefin  framework  produces heuristic  advice for  appropriate action in  the homeland security 
enterprise. I think it is especially valuable as a guide to acting within complexity.
CHARLES: Okay, I follow.  But  heuristic  advice  is insufficient.  By  your  earlier  argument,  one 
does not  predict the outcomes of a  complex  system. And recall our  agreement that  prediction is 
the true measure of useful theory.
JACQUES: (discouraged) That  is where I run  into difficulty.  My  admittedly  idealistic  hope is to 
be able to use the theory  to make predictions about  something significant in  homeland security. 
I can  handle prediction  in  the simple and complicated domains.  But  if the catalytic core of 
homeland security’s trajectory  resides within  the complex  domain,  prediction  – at  least 
significant prediction – will not  be possible. If it  is possible,  then the homeland security 
enterprise is not a complex adaptive system – at least as I understand that term. 
CHARLES: (encouraging)  Maybe we have not  yet  discovered how  to predict  complex events?85 
Perhaps the best we can do, as Gaile said, is to adjust our sails.
BARCLAY: (abruptly) I am  trying not  to be dense,  but  what  does "adjust our  sails" mean in 
homeland security?
JACQUES: (slowly)  To me it  means paying  attention  – for  the problems you  care about – to 
where you  are in  the issue attention  cycle, knowing your phenomenological options,  and then 
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acting  according to what  Mary  Parker  Follet  called “the law  of the situation.” 86 The theory  I’m 
proposing helps leaders parse the situation they are in so they can be more effective.
BARCLAY: We have found another  use of theory, at least  descriptive theory: to act  as a  roadmap 
for strategic leadership.
CHARLES: (aseptically) As much as I might  enjoy  speculating about your  grand theory, I have 
two other  problems with  it.  First, your  insistence on  a  significant initiating  event  rules out  slowly 
moving  catastrophes, such  as climate change, a deteriorating national  education  system, and 
similar social trends.87 Secondly, what would it take to falsify your idea?
JACQUES: Why do you want to falsify it?
GAILE:  (elaborating) If a  claim  can’t  be falsified then  it  is not  scientific. It  would be what Hume 
called a relation of ideas, something true simply by definition.88 Karl Popper made this point.89 
CHARLES: Your  model describes how  you  claim  to see homeland security. Popper  would argue 
you  probably  already  had the ideas in  your  head before you  applied them  to homeland security. 
He believed we imagine first, then  test  our  ideas – our  models – through  experimentation. The 
task of science is to try  to falsify  ideas, not  to prove them.  Through  that  process our  models get 
better  and we know  more.90 If your  theory  cannot be disproven, even  hypothetically,  then  it  adds 
nothing of substance to our  store of knowledge.91  As intricate a  formulation  as you've 
constructed, what would it take to falsify your views?
JACQUES: (distracted) I would like to think more about  that,  but  my  immediate reaction  is it 
would be easy  to falsify. Show  me a  leader  who's good in  a  crisis because he follows how-to-be-a-
leader rules,92 and I'll say there's something wrong with my framework.
CHARLES: But  I hope your  framework, your model, your  grand theory  – whatever  you’re calling 
it – is not simply another way to say something about leadership that’s already well known.
JACQUES: (bruised) Thank you.
CHARLES: (ignores comment)  You  claim  to have a  way  to explain  what  it took to produce the 
homeland security  enterprise. You  say  it  took events to initiate and sustain  a  pattern  of behavior 
you're  calling  the homeland security  issue attention cycle.  Even  hypothetically,  what  would it 
take to demonstrate you are wrong? How could you falsify the claim?
JACQUES: (defensively  exasperated)  Listen,  it  took me long  enough  to make this up.  I'm  not 
ready  to try  to falsify  it yet.  I'm  still  trying  to understand what  it means, what  hypotheses I can 
derive from  it,  and how  I can test  those hypotheses. I'm  not  yet ready  to think  about  proving 
myself wrong. I want to see where my  approach  leads first.  I am  more interested in  seeing  where 
the idea goes, in pursuing it, than in convincing you it’s right.
GAILE: I believe I can think of a way  to falsify  it. Let's say  there is an event  that happens in 
United States similar  to the 2011  Fukushima event – say  at  California’s Diablo Canyon or San 
Onofre nuclear  plants. There is an  earthquake,  a  tsunami, and a  reactor  meltdown. According  to 
Jacques’ issue cycle theory, the homeland security  enterprise would be substantially  changed as 
the repercussions of that event ripple through the nation.
CHARLES: (dismissively)  That is a  trivial  observation.  It  is little more than  saying,  "If 
something really horrible happens in the United States, things will change."
BARCLAY: (evenly) I don't think you're being fair here.
CHARLES: It’s not  a  matter  of fairness. I don’t believe we need a  moderately  interesting  but 
arcane collection  of ideas to tell  us what  we already  know.  The grand theory  is not  precise 
enough  to give us anything more than  another  set  of words for  describing how  one person  sees 
the world of homeland security.
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GAILE: (pleased) You  are not being  consistent,  Professor Charles. Earlier  you  said you  wanted 
everyone to be their own theorist.  Now  you  have Jacques offering a  theory  and you criticize the 
ideas as restating the obvious. You can't have it both ways.
CHARLES: (amused) Well,  as Emerson  wrote, “A  foolish  consistency  is the hobgoblin  of little 
minds.” I applaud Jacques for  the cycle  theory.  However, I do not  believe I am  being foolishly 
inconsistent in trying to challenge Jacques’ ideas.  Science is less about what one person does, 
and more about the activity  of the entire scientific community. What  we who care about  this 
embryonic  homeland security  discipline do is listen  to each  other, agree,  disagree,  ask  for 
evidence, modify  ideas, disprove ideas,  extend ideas, and so on.  That's how  science makes 
progress. That’s how we will make progress.
BARCLAY: (pressing) Are you agreeing or disagreeing with Professor Jacques?
CHARLES: Neither. I am  demonstrating  what I said earlier. I want every  person who cares 
about  homeland security  to be their  own  theorist. I want  them  to make claims about  why  we 
have the homeland security  enterprise we have,  what  it  took to produce the enterprise, pose any 
research  questions they  have. I want them  to support  their  claims with whatever  evidence they 
can  marshal: use data, rhetoric, analysis. I don't  care. But I do care that  they  share those ideas 
with  others,  in  writing and in  conversation. And that  they  share with  transformational openness: 
asking,  “What do I have to believe in  order  to see the world like Jacques does,  or  Gaile,  or 
Barclay?”  I expect  them  to listen  to me the same way: What  do they  have to believe to see as 
Charles does? As we learn  to speak and listen  to each other, we will  remain  alive to the 
continuously  evolving  theoretical and empirical  cultures of homeland security.  Open  this theory 
building activity to everyone. Not just to the academic hegemony.
[A pause for silence.]
GAILE: (dryly)  I feel like I should be hearing  a  rising  chorus of strings and horns about  now. 
Had we more time, Professor Charles,  I'd ask you  what  evidence you  would accept  to refute your 
last claim, your own normative ideas about how we should create homeland security theory.
CHARLES: (tickled) That would be easy.  Have the academic priesthood use their  special 
training to come up with  breakthrough  ideas or  solutions to homeland security’s wicked 
problems.93 If they  can  do that while others who are less skilled cannot,  I would be willing  to 
rethink my claim about encouraging everyone to be a homeland security theorist.
GAILE: I agree we should focus on  solving  the thorny  problems.  That’s why  I question whether 
we even  need homeland security  theories.  There is not  enough  uniqueness in  what  we do to 
warrant  a  novel academic approach.  I think  homeland security  as a  profession  is analogous to 
health. 94  The health  profession includes innumerable disciplines,  problems,  bodies of 
knowledge, and inquiry  methods; together  they  combine to form  a  meta-discipline called health. 
Maybe it’s the same with  homeland security.  There is no grand theory  of health.  Homeland 
security also can do well without one. 
CHARLES: I’m  not willing  to rule out  a  grand theory.  But  I’m  more enthusiastic  about 
discovering as many interesting homeland security theories as people can create.
GAILE: As I’ve said,  the professional  disciplines that constitute homeland security  – law 
enforcement, the military,  intelligence, emergency  management,  public health, fire services – 
give us enough  ideas to work  with. The same thing  is true for  traditional academic disciplines –
like public  policy,  public administration, economics, sociology, biology, geography, 
mathematics,  computer  science,  and so on.  They  offer  a  wealth  of useful theories to people who 
want to improve security.  We don’t  need new  theories.  We do need to get  better  at  using  the 
ones we already have.   
JACQUES: And I believe it's worth  building on the 500-year  tradition  of Western  science.  Let’s 
apply  to homeland security  the tools and logics that  brought us the philosophical  and material 
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progress we enjoy  today.  The grand theory  I propose is certainly  not perfect,  but I believe it  can 
help take us to the next stage in the development of our profession.
[A very long silence.]
BARCLAY: Well, it looks like we have reached a stopping point.  Shall we go?
CHARLES: Yes, let’s go.
GAILE: Yes, let’s.
JACQUES: Yes.
[They do not move.]
That is the way leaves fall around a tree in autumn, a tree unaware of the rain running down its 
sides, of the sun or the frost, and of life gradually retreating inward. The tree does not die. It waits. – 
Herman Hesse
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2011), http://www.hsaj.org/?article=7.1.1
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BELLAVITA, WAITING FOR HOMELAND SECURITY THEORY  28
HOMELAND SECURITY AFFAIRS, VOLUME 8  ARTICLE 16 (AUGUST 2012) WWW.HSAJ.ORG
9 Here are some definitions of theory, representative of the wide range of the word’s meaning: 
“A theory is any systematic and coherent collection of ideas that relate to a specific subject….  There is no 
requirement that the collection be demonstrated, and it can even be false…. String Theory in physics is 
highly speculative, but it’s still a theory….” Steven Dutch, “What Is a Theory?” http://www.uwgb.edu/
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295-296.
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English Dictionary, http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/200431?
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theories.” Barney G. Glaser, The Discovery of Grounded Theory: Strategies for Qualitative Research 
Observations (Chicago: Aldine Publishing, 1967), 32-33.
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Conceptual Foundations (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003), 5, 7.
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and is propounded or accepted as accounting for the known facts; a statement of what are held to be the 
general laws, principles, or causes of something known or observed.” Oxford English Dictionary, http://
www.oed.com/view/Entry/200431?rskey=Uxn8tb&result=1&isAdvanced=false#eid. 
“The words hypothesis, law, and theory refer to different kinds of statements… that scientists make about 
natural phenomena. A hypothesis is a proposition that attempts to explain a set of facts in a unified way.… 
A scientific law is a hypothesis that is assumed to be universally true.… A theory is a set of statements, 
including laws and hypotheses, that explains a group of observations or phenomena in terms of those laws 
and hypotheses. A theory thus accounts for a wider variety of events than the law does.” The American 
Heritage Science Dictionary (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 2005), 313.
“[In] modern science the term ‘theory’, or ‘scientific theory’ is generally understood to refer to a proposed 
explanation of empirical phenomena, made in a way consistent with [the] scientific method. Such theories  
are preferably described in such a way that any scientist in the field is in a position to understand and 
either provide empirical support ("verify") or empirically contradict (‘falsify’) it. In this modern scientific 
context the distinction between theory and practice corresponds roughly to the distinction between 
theoretical science and technology or applied science.” http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Theory. “Consider 
the following usages of the word ‘theory’ [:] the Ptolemaic Theory of the solar system, the Phlogiston 
Theory of combustion, the Theory of Relativity, Grand Unified Theories of physics, the Theory of 
Continental Drift, Stress Theory, Number Theory, Music Theory, the Theory of Evolution.” Dutch, “What 
Is a Theory?” http://www.uwgb.edu/dutchs/PSEUDOSC/WhatTheory.HTM.
10 Christopher Bellavita, ed., How Public Organizations Work: Learning from Experience (New York: 
Praeger. 1990), xvi; Kaplan, The Conduct of Inquiry, 298-302; Godfrey-Smith, Theory and Reality, 6.
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11 This is a position articulated by William Whewell (1794-1866). “The hypotheses which we accept ought 
to explain phenomena which we have observed. But they ought to do more than this; our hypotheses 
ought to foretell phenomena which have not yet been observed; ... because if the rule prevails, it includes 
all cases; and will determine them all, if we can only calculate its real consequences. Hence it will predict 
the results of new combinations, as well as explain the appearances, which have occurred in old ones. And 
that it does this with certainty and correctness, is one mode in which the hypothesis is to be verified as 
right and useful.” — William Whewell, Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences, Vol. 2 (1847), 62-63. [Cited 
at http://www.todayinsci.com/QuotationsCategories/P_Cat/Prediction-Quotations.htm.] Whewell is 
credited with, among other things, inventing the word “scientist,” at the behest of the poet Samuel Taylor 
Coleridge.  See http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/whewell/ and http://www.oed.com.libproxy.nps.edu/
view/Entry/172698?redirectedFrom=scientist#eid. 
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genuine prediction by theory. It is well known that all mathematized sciences have gone through these 
successive stages of evolution. — John von Neumann  “Formulation of the Economic Problem” in Theory 
of Games and Economic Behavior (1964), 8. Reprinted in John Von Neumann, F. Bródy and Tibor Vámos 
eds., The Neumann Compendium (2000), 416. 
12 See “Layers of Security” at http://www.tsa.gov/what_we_do/layers/index.shtm. For an example of 
contrary descriptive theory on the 20 layers of security, see “Unfolding TSA Layered Security” at http://
aviationknowledge.wikidot.com/aviation:unfolding-tsa-layered-security. For a claim that there are 
twenty-one, not twenty security layers, see John Mueller and Mark G. Stewart, Terror, Security, and 
Money: Balancing the Risks, Benefits, and Costs of Homeland Security (Oxford University Press, 2011), 
138. Mueller and Stewart include “international partnerships;” the TSA “Layers of Security” website does 
not (when last accessed on April 10, 2012).
13 For a summary of Kuhn’s position on what is called in this paper descriptive theory, see “Evolution of 
Descriptive Theory” at http://www2.uiah.fi/projekti/metodi/124.htm.
14 Fathali Moghaddam, “The Staircase to Terrorism: A Psychological Exploration,” American Psychologist 
60, no. 2 (February/March 2005): 161–169. 
15 “An explanation “answers the question ‘Why did the explanadum-phenomenon occur?’ by showing that 
the phenomenon resulted from certain particular circumstances….” Graham T. Allison, Essence of 
Decision; Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971), 278, note 5, citing Carl G. 
Hempel, Aspects of Scientific Explanation, and Other Essays in the Philosophy of Science (New York: 
Free Press, 1965), 337.
16  Homeland  Security Presidential Directive (HSPD) 21: “ Public Health and Medical 
Preparedness” (October 18, 2007), 3, http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/hspd-21.htmHSPD21.  
17 George L. Kelling and James Q. Wilson, “Broken Windows: The Police and Neighborhood Safety,” The 
Atlantic (March 1982), http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1982/03/broken-windows/
4465/?single_page=true. 
18 The National Incident Management System (NIMS); see www.fema.gov/pdf/emergency/nims/
NIMSFAQs.pdf
19 Attributed.
20 “Reality is that which, when you stop believing in it, doesn't go away.” Philip K. Dick, “How to Build a 
Universe That Doesn’t Fall Apart Two Days Later” (1978), http://deoxy.org/pkd_how2build.htm. 
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Correspondence Theory of Truth," Edward N. Zalta, ed., The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 
2009 Edition), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2009/entries/truth-correspondence/#3.   
22 I am using the phrase to mean “A metaphor for any group activity performed for personal gratification.”  
http://www.wordnik.com/words/circle%20jerk
23 This framework is adapted from Gibson Burrell and Gareth Morgan, Sociological Paradigms and 
Organisational Analysis: Elements of the Sociology of Corporate Life (London: Heinemann, 1979), 
21-37.
24 Max Weber defined ideal types as “[a theoretical construct] formed by the one-sided accentuation of 
one or more points of view and by the synthesis of a great many diffuse, discrete, more or less present and 
occasionally absent concrete individual phenomena, which are arranged according to those one sidedly 
emphasized viewpoints into a unified analytical construct. In its conceptual purity, this mental construct 
cannot be found empirically anywhere in reality.  … It has the significance of a purely ideal limiting 
concept with which the real situation or action is compared ….”  Dictionary of Visual Discourse: A 
Dialectical Lexicon of Terms (Surrey: Ashgate Publishing, 2011), s.v. "IDEAL TYPE," http://
www.credoreference.com/entry/ashgtvd/ideal_type. 
25 For an example of homeland security as a rational reality (as defined in the text), see Richard J. 
Hartnett, et. al., “Augmenting the DGPS Broadcast with Emergency Information,” Homeland Security 
Affairs, Best Papers from the IEEE Conference on Technologies for Homeland Security (January 2011). 
http://www.hsaj.org/?article=supplement3.5
26 For an example of the structural reality of homeland security, see Samuel Clovis, “Federalism, 
Homeland Security and National Preparedness: A Case Study in the Development of Public Policy,” 
Homeland Security Affairs 2, no. 3 (October 2006), http://www.hsaj.org/?article=2.3.4 
27 For examples of homeland security from a group perspective, see Fathali Moghaddam and James 
Breckenridge, “Homeland Security and Support for Multiculturalism, Assimilation, and Omniculturalism 
Policies among Americans,” Homeland Security Affairs 6, no. 3 (September 2010), http://
www.hsaj.org/?article=6.3.7, and Lulu Rodriguez and Suman Lee, “Factors Affecting the Amplification or 
Attenuation of Public Worry and Dread about Bioterrorist Attacks,” Homeland Security Affairs 6, no. 1 
(January 2010), http://www.hsaj.org/?article=6.1.7
28 James O. Young, "The Coherence Theory of Truth," Edward N. Zalta, ed., The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy (Fall 2008 Edition), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/truth-coherence/.
29 For an example of homeland security from an individual perspective, see Tom Ridge and Larry Bloom, 
The Test of Our Times: America Under Siege...And How We Can Be Safe Again (Thomas Dunne Books, 
2009); and Kip Hawley and Nathan Means, Permanent Emergency: Inside the TSA and the Fight for the 
Future of American Security (Palgrave Macmillan, 2012).
30 One of the characters in the text abruptly terminates the discussion of what counts as data when 
constructing homeland security theory. If the conversation were to continue, the characters would talk 
about deciding whether to use every day events, theories, concepts, metaphors, or paradigms to determine 
what counts as homeland security data. (Bellavita, How Public Organizations Work, xvi.) This would lead 
to a longer discussion about the appropriate modes of homeland security inquiry; a conversation that 
would touch on induction, deduction, abduction, multiple realities, dialectic inquiry, unbounded systems, 
obliquity, detour and access. (C. West Churchman, The Design of Inquiring Systems: Basic Concepts of 
Systems and Organization (New York: Basic Books, 1971); Ian I. Mitroff, The Unbounded Mind: 
Breaking the Chains of Traditional Business Thinking (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993); 
Francois Jullien, Detour and Access: Strategies of Meaning in China and Greece, trans. Sophie Hawkes 
(MIT Press, 2004); and Igor Douven, "Abduction," Edward N. Zalta, ed., The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy (Spring 2011 Edition), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2011/entries/abduction/; John 
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Investigations, P. M. S. Hacker and Joachim Schulte, eds., 4th ed. (Wiley-Blackwell, 2009), 43.
32 Christopher Bellavita, “Changing Homeland Security: What is Homeland Security?” Homeland Security 
Affairs 4, no. 2 (June 2008) http://www.hsaj.org/?article=4.2.1  Shawn Reese, Defining Homeland 
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2012).
33 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Quadrennial Homeland Security Review Report (2010), 11-17. 
34  See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_School_of_Athens.  See also, Raphael's Fresco of the School of 
Athens http://youtu.be/uOrG6jfBzEU, especially from the 1:30 to the 3:40 mark.
35 “Truth is one of the central subjects in philosophy. It is also one of the largest. Truth has been a topic of 
discussion in its own right for thousands of years. Moreover, a huge variety of issues in philosophy relate 
to truth, either by relying on theses about truth, or implying theses about truth.  It would be impossible to 
survey all there is to say about truth in any coherent way.” Michael Glanzberg, "Truth," Edward N. Zalta, 
ed., The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2009 Edition), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/
spr2009/entries/truth/. For more on this practically endless topic, see also F. Fernandez-Armesto, Truth 
(Random House Pod, 2010); Simon Blackburn, Truth: A Guide (Oxford University Press, 2007); and 
Harry G. Frankfurt, On Truth, 1st ed. (New York: Knopf, 2006).
36 René Descartes, A Discourse on the Method, trans. Ian Maclean (Oxford University Press, 2008), 17.
37 Piet J.M. Verschuren, “Holism versus Reductionism in Modern Social Science Research,” Quality and 
Quantity 35, no. 4 (2001): 389-405.
38 A character again tries to bring up modes of inquiry, but neglects to provide details about what the 
ideas mean. See note #30.
39 Paul Feyerabend, Against Method, Fourth ed. (2010),Verso.
40 Peter Facione, “Critical Thinking: What It Is and Why It Counts” (2011), www.insightassessment.com/
pdf_files/what&why2006.pdf; Tim van Gelder, “Teaching Critical Thinking: Some Lessons from 
Cognitive Science” College Teaching 53, no. 1 (2005): 41-46; Linda Kiltz, “Developing Critical Thinking 
Skills in Homeland Security and Emergency Management Courses,” Journal of Homeland Security and 
Emergency Management 6, no. 1 (2009); Matthew L. Collins and Stacy L. Peerbolte, “An Exploratory 
Research Design Further Demonstrating the Need for the Integration of Critical Thinking Skill Curricula 
in Homeland Security and Emergency Management Higher Education Academic Programs,” Journal of 
Homeland Security and Emergency Management 8, no. 2 (2011).
41 Chris Argyris, “Teaching Smart People How To Learn,” Harvard Business Review (May-June 1991): 
148-158.
42 Orion F. White, Jr., and Cynthia J. McSwain. 1983. “Transformational Theory and Organizational 
Analysis,” in Beyond Method: Strategies for Social Research, ed. Gareth Morgan (Sage Publications, Inc., 
1983), 292-305.
43  For a carefully discussed extension of this position, see R. McDermott, “Methodology for Homeland 
Security,” Journal of Homeland Security and Emergency Management (July 2010). http://
www.homelandsecurity.org/journal/Default.aspx?t=346. 
44 “Everywhere science is enriched by unscientific methods and unscientific results, while procedures 
which have often been regarded as essential parts of science are quietly suspended or circumvented… The 
separation of science and non-science is not only artificial but also detrimental to the advancement of 
knowledge. If we want to understand nature, if we want to master our physical surroundings, then we 
must use all ideas, all methods, and not just a small selection of them.” Feyerabend, Against Method, 
305-306
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45 Peter Godfrey-Smith “If we want to understand how science works… the first thing we need to do is 
work out what exactly we are trying to explain. Where does science begin and end? What kind of activity 
counts as 'science'? Unfortunately this is not something we can settle in advance. There is a lot of 
disagreement about what counts as science….” Godfrey-Smith, Theory and Reality, 2. 
Kaplan agrees: “I … forgo a definition [of the scientific method] because I believe there is no one thing to 
be defined.” Kaplan, The Conduct of Inquiry, 27.
“...I think science is not about data; it's not about the empirical content, about our vision of the world. It's 
about overcoming our own ideas, and about going beyond common sense continuously. Science is a 
continuous challenge of common sense, and the core of science is not certainty, it's continuous 
uncertainty. I would even say the joy of taking what we think, being aware that in everything we think, 
there are probably still an enormous amount of prejudices and mistakes, and try to learn to look a little bit  
larger, knowing that there is always a larger point of view that we'll expect in the future.” Carlo Rovelli, 
“Science Is Not About Certainty: A Philosophy of Physics,” Edge (2012), http://www.edge.org/
conversation/a-philosophy-of-physics.
The question of what constitutes basic science appears very straightforward to the Oxford English 
Dictionary: “A branch of study which is concerned either with a connected body of demonstrated truths 
or with observed facts systematically classified and more or less colligated by being brought under general 
laws, and which includes trustworthy methods for the discovery of new truth within its own domain.” 
Oxford English Dictionary, 2nd edition (1989), http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/172672. 
46 “How and why do we accept one theory in preference to others? ...We choose the theory which best 
holds its own in competition with other theories; the one which, by natural selection, proves itself the 
fittest to survive….  A theory is a tool which we test by applying it, and which we judge as to its fitness by 
the result of its application.” Karl Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery, 2nd ed. (Routledge, 2002), 
91.
47 The Quadrennial Homeland Security Review report defines homeland security and the homeland 
security enterprise:  “Homeland security is a concerted national effort to ensure a homeland is safe, 
secure, and resilient against terrorism and other hazards where American interests, aspirations, and way 
of life can thrive.”  “The homeland security ‘enterprise’ refers to the collective efforts and shared 
responsibilities of Federal, State, local, tribal, territorial, nongovernmental, and private-sector partners—
as well as individuals, families, and communities—to maintain critical homeland security capabilities. It 
connotes a broad-based community with a common interest in the safety and well-being of America and 
American society.” U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Quadrennial Homeland Security Review 
Report (2010), 13, 12.
48 Attributed to William Arthur Ward http://www.brainyquote.com/quotes/quotes/w/
williamart110212.html.  The correct quote is “The pessimist complains about the wind; the optimist 
expects it to change; the realist adjusts the sails.”
49 Donald A. Schon, The Reflective Practitioner: How Professionals Think In Action, 1st ed. (Basic Books, 
1984). 
50 Anthony Downs, “Up and Down With Ecology: The ‘Issue-Attention Cycle,’" The Public Interest 28 
(Summer 1972): 38-50; Christopher Bellavita, “Changing Homeland Security: The Issue-Attention Cycle,” 
Homeland Security Affairs 1, no. 1 (June 2005), http://www.hsaj.org/?article=1.1.1; B. Guy Peters and 
Brian W. Hogwood, “In Search of the Issue-Attention Cycle,” Journal of Politics 47, no. 1 (February 1985): 
238-253. For a visual example, see John Sides, “On Haiti, America’s Short Attention Span Strikes Again,” 
Salon.com (2010), http://www.salon.com/2010/04/30/haiti_short_attention_span/singleton/.
51 This depiction of the cycle modifies the cycle’s presentation in the Anthony Downs article, cited in note 
50. Pre-event refers to the period and activities before an event. Event refers to the major event that 
triggers the next phase of the cycle. Alarm signifies national or other significant stakeholder attention to 
the event. Demand means the insistence by officials and the public that the causes and consequences of 
the event be addressed. Awareness of difficulty indicates the growing knowledge that causes and 
consequences will not quickly be remedied. Changing priorities describes the shift of attention to different 
problems. Post-event refers to the transformation of the issue to a new pre-event status.  
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53  “[It] is useful to distinguish between the notions 'complex' and 'complicated'. If the system–despite the 
fact that it may consist of a huge number of components–can be given a complete description in terms of 
its individual constituents, such a system is merely complicated. Things like jumbo jets or computers are 
complicated. In a complex system, on the other hand, the interaction among constituents of the system, 
and the interaction between the system and its environment, are of such a nature that the system as a 
whole cannot be fully understood simply by analyzing its components. Moreover, these relationships are 
not fixed, but shift and change, often as a result of self organization. This can result in novel features, 
usually referred to in terms of emergent properties. The brain, natural language and social systems are 
complex.” Paul Cilliers, Complexity and Postmodernism: Understanding Complex Systems, 1st ed. 
(Routledge, 1998), viii.
54 For a comprehensive list of the agencies and people who constitute the homeland security enterprise, 
see DHS, “Appendix A: Roles And Responsibilities Across The Homeland Security Enterprise.”   
Quadrennial Homeland Security Review Report (2010), A1-A8.
55 Robert F. Ulanowicz, A Third Window: Natural Life Beyond Newton and Darwin (West 
Conshohocken, PA: Templeton Foundation Press, 2009); Raphael D. Sagarin and Terence Taylor, eds. 
Natural Security: A Darwinian Approach to a Dangerous World (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 2008); Rafe Sagarin, Learning From the Octopus: How Secrets from Nature Can Help Us Fight 
Terrorist Attacks, Natural Disasters, and Disease (Basic Books, 2012).
56 A complex adaptive system is “a system in which large networks of components with no central control 
and simple rules of operation give rise to complex collective behavior, sophisticated information 
processing, and adaptation via learning or evolution."  Melanie Mitchell, Complexity: A Guided Tour 
(Oxford University Press, 2009), 13. See also John H. Miller and Scott E. Page, Complex Adaptive 
Systems: An Introduction to Computational Models of Social Life (Princeton University Press, 2007). 
57 For a detailed analysis of how the homeland security enterprise intelligence system is sustained, see 
Dana Priest and William M. Arkin, Top Secret America: The Rise of the New American Security State, 1st 
ed. (Little, Brown and Company, 2011).
58 D. Kettl, System Under Stress: Homeland Security and American Politics, 2nd ed. (CQ Press, 2007); 
Janet Napolitano, “Secretary of Homeland Security Janet Napolitano’s 2nd Annual Address on the State 
of America’s Homeland Security: Homeland Security and Economic Security” presented at the National 
Press Club, January 30, 2012, Washington, DC, http://www.dhs.gov/ynews/speeches/napolitano-state-
of-america-homeland-security.shtm; Paul C. Light, “The Homeland Security Hash” Wilson Quarterly 31, 
no. 2 (2007): 36-44. Presenting homeland security’s first decade as a series of version was suggested to 
me by Ted Lewis.
59 “What is the 'Glass Bead Game'?… Hesse speaks of ‘a game of thoughts called the Glass Bead Game’…: ‘I 
hear music and see men of the past and future. I see wise men and poets and scholars and artists 
harmoniously building the hundred–gated cathedral of Mind.’… The Glass Bead Game is an act of mental 
synthesis through which the spiritual values of all ages are perceived as simultaneously present and vitally  
alive.... [The] game is… a symbol of the human imagination.…"  Hermann Hesse, The Glass Bead Game: 
(Magister Ludi), 1st ed. (New York: Picador USA, 2002), viii-ix.  
60 Homeland Security Council, National Strategy for Homeland Security (2007), 31-39, 44.  
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61 “A key motivation for the rapid deployment of full-body scanners was the foiled Christmas Day plot in 
which a terrorist hid plastic explosives in his underwear….” Mueller and Stewart, Terror, Security, and 
Money, 149.
“AIT [Advanced Imaging Technology] devices, long under consideration by the TSA under the Bush 
administration gained rapid acceptance by TSA after the failed underwear bombing attempt on Christmas 
Day 2009 of a US-bound airliner.” Mickey McCarter, “TSA Rolls Out More Advanced Screening Tech, 
Trusted Traveler Pilot Program,” HS Today, October 7, 2001, http://www.hstoday.us/briefings/today-s-
news-analysis/single-article/tsa-rolls-out-more-advanced-screening-tech-trusted-traveler-pilot-program/
aab613d483e888b4f085f4a69312be97.html.  “December 25, 2009: Umar Faruk Abdulmutallab attempts 
to detonate an explosive device concealed in his underwear on board Northwest flight 253. TSA works 
with DHS, foreign partners, and air carriers to swiftly implement enhanced aviation security 
measures.” [Emphasis added], “TSA Evolution Timeline” (n.d.), www.tsa.gov/assets/pdf/
TSA_evolution_timeline.pdf
62 “Thirty-one cities across the country won’t receive anti-terror funding because of cuts to the 
Department of Homeland Security’s FY 2011 budget.” Janet Wilmoth, “DHS Cuts UASI Grants for 31 
Cities,” Fire Chief, May 20, 2011, http://firechief.com/hazmat/disaster-management/dhs-cuts-uasi-
grants-20110520/.  “The reductions were enacted by the Department of Defense and Full-Year 
Continuing Appropriations Act of 2011 (Public Law 112-10), enacted by President Barack Obama on April 
15 as a budget compromise for the remainder of the fiscal year.” Mickey McCarter, “Diminished DHS 
Grants Draw Praise For Targeting Highest Risks,” HS Today, May 20, 2011, http://www.hstoday.us/
briefings/grants-funding/single-article/diminished-dhs-grants-draw-praise-for-targeting-highest-risks/
f5b1bc10848dd58d7df85fc832b6c0b7.html. 
63 See Milton Friedman’s “The Methodology of Positivist Economics,” in Milton Friedman, Essays in 
Positive Economics (Chicago; London: University of Chicago Press, 1964). The task of theory is “to 
provide a system of generalizations that can be used to make correct predictions about the consequences 
of any change in circumstances. Its performance is to be judged by the precision, scope, and conformity 
with experience of the predictions it yields…. Such a theory is, in general, a complex intermixture of two 
elements. In part, it is a ‘language’ designed to promote ‘systematic and organized methods of reasoning.’ 
In part, it is a body of substantive hypotheses designed to abstract essential features of complex reality…. 
[The] only relevant test of the validity of a hypothesis is comparison of its predictions with experience.” 
4-6.
64 Niels Bohr wrote, "Anyone not shocked by quantum mechanics has not yet understood it." Here is a 
textual (as distinct from mathematical) representation of Heisenberg's Uncertainty Principle (that 
explains the limits of accuracy): “The simultaneous measurement of two conjugate variables (such as the 
momentum and position or the energy and time for a moving particle) entails a limitation on the precision  
(standard deviation) of each measurement. Namely: the more precise the measurement of position, the 
more imprecise the measurement of momentum, and vice versa. [Emphasis added] In the most extreme 
case, absolute precision of one variable would entail absolute imprecision regarding the other.”   It is 
taken from Heisenberg's Zeitschrift für Physik, 43 (1927), 172-198, translated into English by John 
Archibald Wheeler and Hubert Zurek, in Quantum Theory and Measurement, Wheeler and Zurek, eds. 
(Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1983), 62-84.  See http://www.aip.org/history/heisenberg/p08a.htm 
for additional details. For a brief audio explanation by Heisenberg of part of the principle, listen to 
“Heisenberg Recalls His Early Thoughts on the Uncertainty Principle,” http://www.aip.org/history/
heisenberg/uncertain.au.
Wayne Porter argues (in a private conversation, February 2012) the Uncertainty Principle is especially 
relevant when considering contemporary plans and strategies. He claims many national plans are 
developed more from a baseline of what the current position is rather than the direction of momentum.  
He and his co-author describe some implications of this view in Wayne Porter and Mark Mykleby, A 
National Strategic Narrative (Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 2011), http://
www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/nationalstrategicnarrative.pdf. 
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65 “A core challenge in diagnosing why some [social-ecological systems] are sustainable… is the 
identification and analysis of relationships among multiple levels of these complex systems at different 
spatial and temporal scales. Understanding a complex whole requires knowledge about specific variables 
and how their component parts are related. Thus, we must learn how to dissect and harness complexity, 
rather than eliminate it from such systems. This process is complicated, however, because entirely 
different frameworks, theories, and models are used by different disciplines to analyze their parts of the 
complex multilevel whole. A common, classificatory framework is needed to facilitate multidisciplinary 
efforts toward a better understanding of complex [systems].… A framework is… useful in providing a 
common set of potentially relevant variables and their subcomponents to use in the design of data 
collection instruments, the conduct of fieldwork, and the analysis of findings about… complex [systems]." 
Elinor Ostrom, “A General Framework for Analyzing the Sustainability of Social-ecological Systems,” 
Science 325, no. 5939 (2009): 420.
For the distinction Ostrom makes among framework, theory, and model, see Elinor Ostrom, “Institutional  
Rational Choice,” in Theories of the Policy Process, 2nd Edition, ed. Paul A Sabatier, Chapter 2 (Westview 
Press, 2007), 25-26
66 D. Snowden and M Boone, “A Leader’s Framework for Decision Making,” Harvard Business Review 
(November 2007): 70.
67 For additional information about the Cynefin framework, see David Snowdon, “Origins of Cynefin,” 
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